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On October 27, 1986, President Ronald Reagan signed the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA).
1
 This law, designed to give federal 
agencies increased powers to combat drug offenders, created a series 
of minimum sentences for individuals convicted of various drug-
related crimes.
2
 One of the more well-known, and controversial 
provisions in the ADAA proscribed heightened sentences at a 100-to-
one ratio for individuals found with “crack” cocaine as opposed to 
powdered cocaine.
3
 The constitutionality and wisdom of the “100-to-
                                                 
 * J.D. candidate, May 2014, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois 
Institute of Technology.  
1
 Statement by President Ronald Reagan Upon Signing H.R. 5484, 22 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1463 (Nov. 3, 1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5394, 1986 
W.L. 67634 (Leg. Hist.). 
2
 See 41 U.S.C.A. § 841(b) (West 2010). 
3
 See 41 U.S.C.A §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(I-II), 841(b)(1)(A)(vii), 841(b)(1)(B)(ii), 
841(b)(1)(B)(viii) (West 2010). 
1
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one” ratio has been extensively discussed elsewhere
4
 and will not be 
covered in this paper. 
Instead, this paper will address the ADAA’s mandatory minimum 
sentences for deaths or serious injuries resulting from a controlled 
substance and how courts apply these sentences to members of drug 
distribution conspiracies.
5
 These provisions, codified under 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b), establish minimum fines and imprisonment sentences 
whenever a person dies or suffers serious injuries as a result of using 
certain controlled substances defined under the Act.
6
 A dealer who 
sells a fatal dose of heroin, for example, is subject to a statutory 




Most circuits applying the mandatory sentencing language in § 
841(b) hold that a victim’s death does not need to be reasonably 
foreseeable in order for a mandatory sentencing provision to apply.
8
 
According to those courts, § 841(b)’s minimum sentences apply 
whenever a defendant “directly produces, distributes, or uses an 
intermediary to distribute” fatal doses of drugs.
9
 Although the circuits 
disagree on whether § 841(b) creates a “strict liability” offense,
10
 most 





 See, e.g., Elizabeth Tison, Amending the Sentencing Guidelines for Cocaine 
Offenses: The 100-to-1 Ratio is not as “Cracked” Up as Some Suggest, 27 S.  ILL. U. 
L.J. 413 (Winter 2003); Spencer A. Stone, Federal Drug Sentencing – What was 
Congress Smoking? The Uncertain Distinction Between “Cocaine” and “Cocaine 
Base” in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 297 (2007); see 
also 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (West 2010) (Relevant Notes of Decisions (Generally)). 
5
 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b) (West 2010). 
6
 21 U.S.C.A §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), (b)(1)(B)(viii), (b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(C), 
(b)(1)(E)(i-ii) (West 2010). 
7
 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (West 2010). 
8
 United States v. Walker, 721 F.3d 828, 834 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing precedent 




 See, e.g., United States v. Houston, 406 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 2005) (stopping 
short of ascribing a “strict liability” language to § 841(b)). 
2
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circuits still apply the minimum sentences without finding whether a 
death or injury was foreseeable.
11
 
Even though the circuits generally agree
12
 that § 841(b) applies to 
individuals who produce or distribute fatal doses of drugs, the analysis 
becomes more complicated when applied to members of drug 
distribution conspiracies.
13
 On July 3, 2013, the Seventh Circuit, in 
United States v. Walker, held, as a matter of first impression, that § 
841(b)’s minimum sentences could apply to members of a drug 
distribution conspiracy operating in the area around Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin.
14
 That court held that district courts, when applying § 
841(b) mandatory sentences to members of a drug distribution 
conspiracy, must make additional findings of fact beyond those 
required for applying § 841(b) to individuals.
15
 Joining with the Sixth 
Circuit, the Seventh Circuit held that when the government brings 
charges against a drug distribution conspiracy, fact finders must make 
specific findings regarding each defendant’s place within the 
distribution chain that led to a death or serious injury.
16
 Section 
841(b)’s mandatory sentences only apply if the defendant’s conduct 
falls within the “chain of distribution” for the fatal dose.
17
 
This Comment will argue that the Seventh Circuit made the 
correct decision when it adopted a fact-specific test for applying 
mandatory sentences to members of drug distribution conspiracies 
under § 841(b). First, this Comment will look at the legislative history 
behind § 841(b). Second, this Comment will analyze how other courts 




 The Supreme Court recently granted cert to United States v. Burrage, 687 
F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2013), cert granted, --- U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 2049, 185 L.Ed.2d 
884 (2013). This case will decide whether § 841 creates “strict liability” crimes 
without a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement. This decision could affect 
how courts apply § 841(b) to individuals. Their decision, however, should not affect 
the Seventh Circuit’s application of the “chain of distribution” theory towards 
members of drug-organizations. 
13
 Walker, 721 F.3d at 831. 
14
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have applied § 841(b)’s mandatory sentencing provisions. Third, this 
Comment will analyze the facts in United States v. Walker, discuss 
how the Seventh Circuit’s holding distinguished between each 
defendants’ various roles within the conspiracy, and analyze each 
defendants’ relationship with the deceased. Finally, this Comment will 
argue that the court’s decision in Walker takes an important step 
towards a more unified sentencing scheme for drug related 
conspiracies operating within the Seventh Circuit.  
 
I. THE ANTI-DRUG ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1986 
 
During the 1980s, the United States saw a drastic increase in drug 
sales and drug related crimes.
18
 A new cheap and dangerous drug, 
“crack” cocaine, entered the United States in small quantities in the 
early 1980s but quickly expanded to epidemic proportions.
19
 The 
Federal Government estimated that, from 1984 to 1986, drug dealers 
doubled the amount of crack cocaine imported into the United States – 
an increase from 85 tons to 150 tons.
20
 At the same time, drug 
organizations imported an additional 12 tons of heroin, 60,000 tons of 
marijuana, and 200 tons of hashish to the United States.
21
 In total, the 
government estimated that the total dollar value of all illegal drugs 




In addition to the increased import and sale of illegal drugs, a 
huge percentage of America’s prison population had either previously 
                                                 
18
 See U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Drugs and 
Crime Facts, 1988, reprinted at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dcf88.pdf (last 




 132 CONG. REC. E3106-01 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1986) (extension of remarks 




 132 CONG. REC. H 6716 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1986) (statement of Rep. 
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used illegal drugs or was currently serving sentences for drug related 
offenses. In 1986 alone, 75% of jail inmates, 79.5% of state prisoners, 
and 82.7% of youth in long-term juvenile facilities reported using 
illegal drugs at some point in their lives.
23
 Furthermore, the same 
study showed that 54% of all inmates in state prisons reported that 
they were either under the influence of drugs, alcohol, or both, when 
they committed their crimes.
24
 Finally, the FBI reported that arrests for 
drug violations doubled from 1970 to 1985 – increasing from 400,000 
in 1970 to more than 800,000 in 1985.
25
 These findings prompted 
Congressional action. 
On September 8, 1986 Texas’ representative, James Wright, joined 
by more than 300 members of the House of Representatives, 
introduced H.R. 5484 – The Anti-Drug Enforcement Act of 1986.
26
 
This bill was designed to encourage foreign cooperation to combat 
drug production and international drug trafficking, to provide Federal 
leadership in creating anti-drug and rehabilitation programs,
27
 and to 
establish sentencing criteria for individuals convicted of certain drug-
related crimes.
28
 Because of H.R. 5484’s various foreign and domestic 
concerns, it was referred to fourteen House committees for 
consideration, including the Committee on Armed Forces, the 
                                                 
23




 132 CONG. REC. H 6716 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1986) (statement of Rep. John  




 H.R. 5484 (99
th
): Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, GOV TRACK,  
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/99/hr5484 (last visited Dec. 15, 2013). This 
website lists all of the sponsors for H.R. 5484.  
27
 132 CONG. REC. H6459-01 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1986) (Public Bills and 
Resolution), reprinted in 1986 WL 785682. 
28
 132 CONG. REC. H 6716 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1986) (statement of Rep. Byron 
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On September 11, 1986, H.R. 5484 returned to the House floor for 
an extensive five-hour debate.
30
  During this debate, the House 
considered, and ultimately passed, eighteen amendments to the bill, 
including amendments affecting foreign expenditures
31
 and 
amendments increasing funding for certain drug treatment programs.
32
 
Pennsylvania Representative George Gekas proposed one of the most 
contentious amendments debated by the House.
33
 That amendment 
added a death penalty option for criminals involved in organized drug 
distribution operations, particularly when their actions led to the 
deaths of another person.
34
  
Dean Gallo, a Representative from New Jersey, supported 
Representative Gekas’ death-penalty amendment.
35
 In his argument, 
Representative Gallo praised H.R. 5484 as an important step towards 
combining past legislative efforts to combat drug abuse into one 
“across-the-board” approach.
36
 But he felt that Congress’s actions, 
particularly against drug distributors, did not go far enough.
37
 
Specifically citing the mandatory sentencing provision for death or 
serious injuries coming from drug-use, Representative Gallo argued: 
                                                 
29
 132 CONG. REC. H6459-01 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1986) (Public Bills and 
Resolution), reprinted in 1986 WL 785682. 
30
 Bill Summary & Status, 99
th
 Congress (1985-86), H.R. 5484, All 
Congressional Actions with Amendments, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/D?d099:1:./temp/~bd51if:@@@S|/home/LegislativeData.php?n=BSS;c
=99| [hereinafter Bill Summary & Status]. 
31
 Id. For example, H.AMDT.1189 required that Mexico investigate the murder 




 Bill Summary & Status, 99
th
 Congress (1985-86), H.AMDT.1203, available 




 132 CONG. REC. H 6716 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1986) (statement of Rep. Dean 
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Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this 
comprehensive approach and then to go one step farther to 
break the biggest link in the chain of drug production delivery 
and dependency. I am referring to the organized system that 
exists exclusively to make big money by distributing 
imported, watered down, and repackaged illegal drugs for 
street sales. Criminals who are making big money from this 
illegal enterprise and whose actions result in the death of 
another person deserve the most severe possible sentence. I 





A draft of H.R. 5484 containing the death penalty language ultimately 
passed the House with a vote of 392-16.
39
 
Following this vote, Arlan Strangeland, a representative from 
Minnesota, went on the House floor and expressed happiness that the 
bill had been passed by such a clear majority.
40
 He praised 
Congressional action, stating that, “[t]he easy access to illegal drugs 
and the significant use by Americans demonstrate the validity of 
taking harsh steps to escalate the war against drugs.”
41
 Although he 
admitted that the bill could never be an all-inclusive fix, he maintained 
that, by creating new crimes and increasing sentences for criminals 
convicted of drug-related crimes, the House took an important step 
towards meeting an “enormous challenge.”
42
 
The Senate received H.R. 5484 on September 15, 1986 and began 
considering the legislation on September 26, 1986.
43
 During floor 
debate, the Senate considered and passed seven amendments.
44
 Some 
                                                 
38
 Id. (emphasis added). 
39
 Bill Summary & Status, supra note 30. 
40
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of these amendments simply addressed technical corrections,
45
 while 
others granted funds to community groups in order to sponsor anti-
drug and -alcohol abuse programs.
46
 One amendment, however, 
removed H.R. 5484’s death-penalty provision.
47
 The Senate approved 
H.R. 5484 on bill with a 97-2 vote on September 30, 1986.
48
  
The House approved the Senate’s bill by unanimous consent, but 
attached a related bill, H.R. 5664, as an amendment.
49
 That 
amendment reintroduced the death penalty as a possible punishment 
for violating the Anti-Drug Enforcement Act of 1986.
50
 This action 
was not without its share of controversy. For example, Representative 
Dan Kildee, from Michigan, warned against adopting a federal death 
penalty provision as part of an anti-drug measure.
51
 Specifically, he 
claimed that, if Congress enacted the Act with a death penalty 
provision, the United State would join South Africa as one of the only 
industrialized nations that allows a federal death penalty (as separate 
from state death penalties).
52
 Notwithstanding his dissent, the House 
of Representative approved language containing the death penalty 
provision with a 378-16-38 vote.
53
 
The Senate rejected the death penalty provision, and instead 
instituted mandatory life sentences
54
 by a vote of 50-38.
55
 The House 
                                                 
45
 See, e.g., Bill Summary & Status, 99
th
 Congress (1985-86), S.AMDT. 3093, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d099:SP03093: (Senate amendment 
sponsored by Sen. Robert Dole (KS)). 
46
 See, e.g., Bill Summary & Status, 99
th
 Congress (1985-86), S.AMDT.3047, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d099:SP03047: (Senate amendment 
sponsored by Sen. Mark Andrews (ND)). 
47
 See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. H10776-04 (Elie Wiesel: Speak Truth to Power, 
Oct. 17, 1986) (statement by Rep. Claude Pepper) reprinted in 1986 WL 788784 
[hereinafter Elie Wiesel]. 
48












 132 CONG. REC. S16915 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement by Sen. Carl 
Levin) reprinted in 1986 WL 788855. 
55
 Bill Summary & Status, supra note 30. 
8
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of Representatives ultimately approved the Senate’s version without 
the death penalty provision.
56
 A joint bill passed both chambers and 
was sent to President Ronald Reagan on October 27, 1986.
57
 President 
Reagan signed the bill on the same day.
58
 
Although the death penalty amendment ultimately did not make 
its way into the law, the intense debate
59
 surrounding the amendment 
represents an early attempt by Congress to recognize increased 
sentences, although not referred to as “mandatory,” for criminals 
involved in organized drug distribution operations.
60
 Specifically, 
members of Congress repeatedly voiced concerns that “drug kingpins” 
may take extreme measures, including killing, in order to establish 
their drug empires.
61
 Although the cases discussed in this Comment do 
not concern drug-related murders, the discussions in Congress 
represent Congressional intent to apply strict sentences to leaders of 
illegal drug distribution organizations. 
 
II. THE CIRCUITS’ APPLICATION OF § 841(B) TO INDIVIDUALS 
 
In United States v. Walker, the Seventh Circuit applied § 841(b)’s 
minimum sentences for any death or serious bodily injury to members 
of a drug distribution “conspiracy.”
62
 Because applying § 841(b) to 
members of a drug distribution conspiracy was a matter of first 
impression in the Seventh Circuit,
63
 an analysis of how the Seventh 
Circuit, and other circuits, interprets § 841(b) as applied to individual 
defendants is instructive.  
The Seventh Circuit in Walker recognized that when applying § 
841(b)’s minimum sentencing requirement for death or serious bodily 
                                                 
56
 132 CONG. REC. E3826-01 (daily ed. Oct. 18 1986) (extension of remarks by 
Sen. Ted Weiss) reprinted in 1986 WL 789718. 
57




 Elis Weisel, supra note 46. 
60




 United States v. Walker, 721 F.3d 828, 836 (7th Cir. 2013).  
63
 Id. at 834. 
9
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injuries, the other circuits fit into two camps.
64
 The majority of circuits 
agree that a death resulting from use of an illegal drug does not need to 
be foreseeable, and therefore they define § 841(b) as a “strict liability” 
offense.
65
  The Seventh and Ninth Circuits, however, while also not 
considering whether the death or serious injury was foreseeable, do 
not consider § 841(b) as a “strict liability” statute.
66
 
The majority of circuits apply the mandatory sentencing 
provisions in § 841(b) without considering whether a victim’s death 
was reasonably foreseeable.
67
 The rationale behind this approach is 
that Congress, when drafting § 841(b), neglected to include any 
reference to a defendant’s mental state before triggering the mandatory 
sentencing provision.
68
 Instead of reading a mens rea requirement into 




In United States v. Soler, the First Circuit, as an issue of first 
impression, applied § 841(b)’s mandatory sentencing after several men 
died from a heroin overdose.
70
 In that case, several men purchased a 
drug, initially thought to be cocaine, from Abinal Soler, a drug dealer 
in Sunderland, Massachusetts.
71
 Unbeknownst to those men, the drug 
was actually heroin.
72
 When the men snorted the heroin they collapsed 
and died from drug overdose.
73
 Police arrested the drug dealer and 
charged him under § 841(b) for “distribution of heroin, death 
                                                 
64
 Id. at 835. 
65
 Id. at 834 (citing United States. v. Soler, 275 F.3d 146, 152 (1st Cir. 2008); 
United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 2001)). 
66
 Id. at 835. 
67
 See id. at 835 (citing United States v. Webb, 655 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2011); 
United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Houston, 
406 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Soler, 275 F.3d 146 (1st Cir. 2002); 
United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Robinson, 
167 F.3d 824 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 
1994)).  
68




 United States v. Soler, 275 F.3d 146, 149 (1st Cir. 2002). 
71
 Id. at 153. 
72
 Id. at 149. 
73
 Id.  
10
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resulting,” and other drug distribution statutes.
74
 A jury convicted 
Soler on all counts.
75
  
Soler appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the key event leading to 
the death – snorting heroin under the misimpression that it was 
cocaine – was not reasonably foreseeable.
76
 The First Circuit, 
however, noted that § 841(b) does not contain any language indicating 
a requisite state of mind for defendants.
77
 Specifically, the First Circuit 
stated, “[a]fter all, Congress knows how to write statutes containing 
state-of-mind-requirements-and[sic] Congress demonstrated that 
facility in crafting this very statute.”
78
 The First Circuit, therefore, held 
that § 841(b) should apply under a “rule of strict liability.”
79
 
Likewise, the Eighth Circuit applies § 841(b) under a strict 
liability theory.
80
 In United States v. McIntosh, a woman, Jean Smith, 
and her 12- and 14-year-old children moved in with a man named 
Curtis McIntosh.
81
 Although Jean initially agreed to move in with 
McIntosh and maintain his home if he would supply her with 
methamphetamine, the two soon began a romantic relationship.
82
 Jean 
eventually gave methamphetamine to her 14-year-old daughter, who 
tragically overdosed and died.
83
 McIntosh, despite not knowing that 
the daughter was given methamphetamine, was convicted of violating 




On appeal, McIntosh argued that the lower court erroneously 
increased his sentence without a finding that the death was reasonably 
                                                 
74
Id. at 150. Soler was also charged under 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) (West 
2010); 21 U.S.C.A. § 860(a) (West 2013); 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West 2013). 
75
 Id.  
76
 Id. at 152. 
77
 Id.  
78
 Id.  
79
 Id. at 153; see also U.S. v. Rebmann, 226 F.3d 521, 525 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(stating, in dicta, that § 841(b) is a strict liability statute.). 
80
 United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 2001). 
81






 Id. at 971. 
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 The Eighth Circuit disagreed.
86
 Citing holdings from the 
Third
87
 and Fourth Circuits,
88
 the Eighth Circuit held that the plain 
intent of Congress was that § 841(b)’s sentencing enhancements 
should apply without regard to proximate cause or foreseeability.
89
 
Interestingly, the Eight Circuit, in McIntosh, considered applying 
a similar “chain of causation” theory
90
 that the Seventh Circuit 
ultimately applied in United States v. Walker.
91
 But rather than apply § 
841(b) to a criminal “conspiracy,” the Eighth Circuit held that the 
“chain of causation” theory should only apply where a defendant 
either manufactures or distributes the fatal dose.
92
 Instead, based on 
the facts in McIntosh, § 841(b) imposed “strict liability” on McIntosh 




Finally, the Ninth Circuit, while still eschewing the proximate 
cause requirement, stopped short of describing § 841(b) as a “strict 
liability” statute.
94
 In United States v. Houston, the Ninth Circuit 
reviewed the conviction of Rosemary Houston for distributing 
methadone, which resulted in a lethal overdose.
95
 Joining with the 
majority of circuits, that court held that § 841(b) requires a “cause-in-
fact” analysis, but not proximate cause or foreseeability.
96
  
The Ninth Circuit, however, refused to characterize § 841(b) as a 
“strict liability” statute.
97
 Specifically, that court recognized that “there 
may be fact patterns in which the distribution of a controlled substance 




 Id. at 975. 
87
 See United States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824, 831 (3d. Cir. 1999). 
88
 See United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 1994). 
89
 McIntosh, 236 F.3d at 972-73. 
90
 Id. at 974. 
91
 See United States v. Walker, 721 F.3d 828, 836 (7th Cir. 2013)(calling the 
test a “chain of distribution” test.). 
92




 United States v. Houston, 406 F.3d 1121, 1125-24 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005). 
95
 Id. at 1121. 
96
 Id. at 1124-25. 
97
 Id. at  n.5. 
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is so removed and attenuated from the resulting death that criminal 
liability could not be imposed within the bounds of Due Process.”
98
 
The Seventh Circuit in Walker also adopted this rationale, and it may 
have influenced the court’s decision to apply a foreseeability 




The Seventh Circuit’s reluctance to adopt “strict liability” 
language makes sense when compared to its previous holding in U.S. 
v. Hatfield. In Hatfield, the defendants were convicted for burglarizing 
pharmacies and distributing controlled substances.
100
 Because four 
people died and one was seriously injured after using these drugs, the 
trial court applied heightened sentences under § 841(b).
101
   
The Seventh Circuit held that foreseeability and, to a certain 
degree, “but for causation was not required when applying a separate 
portion of § 841(a)(1).
102
 As long as the death “resulted from” the drug 
use, the seller, if found guilty, was subject to the minimum sentence.
103
 
In order to drive this point, the Seventh Circuit contemplated a 
hypothetical scenario where a drug user goes into a bathroom in order 
to avoid being seen while injecting the drug.
104
 While in the bathroom, 
the ceiling collapses on that person, killing him instantly.
105
 Although 
the drug user was only in the bathroom because of the drugs purchased 
from a defendant, “it would be strange to think that the seller of the 
drug” would be punishable.
106
 
The Supreme Court may soon shed some guidance on whether § 
841(b) should be interpreted as a strict liability statute. On June 17, 
2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Burrage v. United 
                                                 
98
 Id.  
99
 United States v. Walker, 721 F.3d 828, 836 (7th Cir. 2013). 
100
 United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 947 (7th Cir. 2010) (The drugs 
included morphine, methadone, oxycodone, fentanyl, alprazolam, cocaine, and 
hydrocodone.). 
101
 Id. at 947. 
102
 Id. at 948-49. 
103
 Id. at 950. 
104
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States, an appeal from the Eighth Circuit.
107
 Although the Eighth 
Circuit in Burrage did not explicitly refer to § 841(b) as a “strict 
liability” statute, that court held that the minimum sentences in § 
841(b) apply without showing proximate cause.
108
 The petitioner in 
Burrage asked the Supreme Court to grant cert to the question of 




As this paper will discuss, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Burrage is unlikely to change the Seventh Circuit’s “chain of 
distribution” test. Specifically, the chain of distribution looks to the 
various members of a drug distribution organization beyond the 
defendant who sold the fatal dose of drugs.
110
 Therefore, even if the 
Supreme Court adopts some heightened level of proof before applying 
§ 841(b), that heightened level of proof will only change the Seventh 
Circuit’s application towards individuals, i.e., the defendant closest to 
the deceased on the chain of distribution.
111
 While such a ruling from 
the Supreme Court will likely change the Seventh Circuit’s treatment 
of drug dealers, it is unlikely to drastically affect its treatment of 




                                                 
107
 Burrage v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2049 (Mem.) (granting petitioner’s writ 
for certiorari). 
108
 United States v., 687 F.3d 1015, 1020 (8th Cir. 2012). 
109
 Petitioner’s Opening Brief, Burrage v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2049 (2013) 
(No. 12-7515), 2013 WL 3830502, at i. 
110
 United States v. Walker, 721 F.3d 828, 831 (7th Cir. 2013). 
111
 See Walker, 721 F.3d, at 831; Burrage, 687 F.3d, at 1020. 
112
 The Supreme Court issued its opinion in Burrage v. United States, --- S. Ct. 
----, 2014 WL 273243 (2014) on January 27, 2014; mere days before this Comment 
was set to be published.  
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court did 
not address the issue of whether § 841(b) has a foreseeability or proximate 
requirement. Instead, the Court held that the “results from” language in § 841(b)’s 
sentencing enhancement precluded the twenty-year minimum sentence where the use 
of a drug distributed by a defendant was not an independently sufficient cause of 
death or serious bodily injury. Because the deceased in Burrage died after ingesting 
multiple drugs from multiple dealers, the defendant was not an independently 
14
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III. U.S. V. WALKER 
 
 In United States v. Walker, the Seventh Circuit, as a matter of 
first impression, applied the minimum sentencing provisions found in 
§ 841(b) to members of a drug distribution conspiracy who did not 
directly distribute a fatal dose of drugs.
113
 This case involved ten 
people: five defendants and five deceased.
114
 These defendants 
occupied various levels within a drug distribution conspiracy – several 
were low-level drug dealers, and the remaining defendants occupied 
higher levels within the organization.
115
 The government charged each 
of the defendants with: 1) possession of heroin with intent to 
distribute, and 2) conspiracy to distribute more than one kilogram of 
heroin.
116
 These charges fell under two statutes;
117
 first, the defendants 
were charged under a different provision in § 841 – specifically § 
841(a)(1)
118
 – and second, the defendants were charged under a 
conspiracy statute codified at 21 U.S.C. § 846.
119
 
                                                                                                                   
sufficient cause of death and could not face the twenty-year minimum sentence for 
distributing a fatal dose of heroin.  
Here, the defendants in United States v. Walker, 721 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2013) 
all died injecting heroin sold by a defendant. There is no evidence that any of the 
deceased were under the influence of other drugs at the time of death. As a result, 
those dealers should meet the requirement of being an “independently sufficient 
cause of death.” Therefore, the Court’s holding in Burrage should have no effect on 
the conclusions argued in this Comment. 
113
 Walker, 721 F.3d at 828. 
114
 Id. at 831. 
115
 Id. at 831-33. 
116




 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) (West 2010). The text of § 841(a)(1) reads: 
(a) Unlawful Acts: 
 Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person 
knowingly or intentionally [. . .] manufacture, distribute, or possess with intent 
to distribute, or disperse, a controlled substance[.] 
119
 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West 2013). The text of § 846 reads: 
Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this 
subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those proscribed for the 
offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy. 
15
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Because five people died after using the defendants’ heroin, the 
government argued that each defendant should receive the minimum 
sentence proscribed for a death resulting from heroin use.
120
 That 
portion of the statute, codified as 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(a), imposes a 
twenty-year minimum sentence, a $10,000 dollar fine, or both.
121
 
Furthermore, the government argued that the mandatory minimum 





A. The Defendants 
 
This case revolved around a heroin distribution conspiracy 
operating in the area around Milwaukee, Wisconsin between 2005 and 
2008.
123
 Lonnie Johnson, a supplier operating out of Chicago, ran this 
organization and provided the bulk quantities of heroin distributed in 
the Milwaukee area.
124
 Johnson was not a defendant in this case. His 
lieutenant, however, Jamie Stewart, was arrested and charged as part 
of the drug operation.
125
 According to the Seventh Circuit, Stewart 




The Seventh Circuit described the heroin conspiracy as a tiered 
structured system, breaking down to citywide distributors and, finally, 
lower-level dealers.
127
 Two defendants, Keith Walker and Eneal 
Gladney, worked out of Milwaukee as high-level dealers.
128
 The 
remaining defendants, Jean Lawler and Jason Lund, operated in 
Pewaukee, Muskego, and Waukesha—cities outside of Milwaukee.
129
 
                                                 
120
 Walker, 721 F.3d at 831. 
121
 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(a) (West 2010). 
122
 Walker, 721 F.3d at 831. 
123
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Jason Lund operated out of Waukesha and connected customers 
with higher-level distributors, including the conspiracy’s “lieutenant,” 
Jamie Stewart.
130
 The final defendant, Jean Lawler, was a lower-level 
member of the conspiracy who purchased small quantities of heroin 




B. Deaths and Subsequent Arrest 
 
The details of this case are tragic: five people lost their lives when 
they overdosed on heroin sold by the defendants.
132
 The Seventh 
Circuit noted that two of the deceased died after injecting heroin 
bought from a defendant, Jason Lund.
133
 One of the deceased, Andrew 
Goetzke, began buying heroin from the drug conspiracy in 2007.
134
 
Although he acted as a confidential informant for police officers, he 
continued to use heroin until his death.
135
 On June 5, 2008, the 
defendant, Lund, drove with Goetzke to Milwaukee in order to buy 
heroin from another defendant, Jamie Stewart.
136
  
Lund and Goetzke split the drugs, with Lund receiving additional 
money for setting up the sale to Goetzke.
137
 After injecting the drugs, 
Goetzke returned to his mother’s home.
138
 The next morning, 
Goetzke’s mother found him unresponsive in his bed.
139
 She called 




One month after Goetzke died, another person, David Knuth, died 
of a heroin overdose after he used heroin provided by Lund.
141
 On July 








 Id. at 832. 
134
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3, 2008, Lund organized the purchase of heroin from the defendant, 
Jamie Stewart.
142
 Lund shared this heroin with Knuth and a third 
person.
143
 Immediately after Knuth injected the heroin, he stopped 
breathing, became unconscious, and began bleeding from the nose.
144
 
Lund drove to an emergency clinic where the third person began 
administering CPR.
145
 Unfortunately, the clinic was closed.
146
 The 
third person called 911 and kept administering CPR in the clinic 
parking lot.
147
 Lund drove off.
148




A third person, Jeffery Topczewski, died after buying heroin from 
the defendant, Jean Lawler.
150
 Topczewski contacted Lawler on 
February 19, 2008 and arranged to buy heroin.
151
 Topczewski went to 
Lawler’s home, purchased the drug, and then returned to his parents’ 
house.
152




The final two deaths in this case occurred in 2007.
154
 These two 
individuals, Valerie Luszak and Joshua Carroll, each purchased heroin 
from members of the drug distribution organization who were not 
defendants in this case.
155
 Although the drug dealers were not 
defendants in the instant case, witnesses were able to identify the 
drugs as heroin sold by the conspiracy due to its unique packaging.
156
  
On July 22, 2008, the government brought a one-count indictment 
against thirty-one defendants, alleging a conspiracy to distribute 
























 Id.  
154
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heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846.
157
 The five 
defendants in this case, Walker, Stewart, Gladney, Lund, and Lawler, 
all entered into plea agreements with the government, but they 
reserved their right to challenge the mandatory sentencing provision 
for deaths proscribed in § 841(b).
158
 Notwithstanding the defendants’ 
objections, the district court applied § 841(b)(1)(a) without any finding 
of foreseeability or proximate cause and sentenced all of the 










C. The “Chain of Distribution” Test: From the Sixth Circuit and 
Beyond. 
 
Because Walker raised an issue of first impression regarding the 
minimum sentencing provisions in § 841(b), the Seventh Circuit 
looked to the other circuits for guidance.
162
 First, the court noted that 
other circuits – including the Seventh Circuit –consistently held that § 
841(b) does not require a death to be reasonably foreseeable before the 
minimum sentence applies.
163
 Instead, the statutory minimum sentence 
applies if the defendant actually distributed or used intermediaries to 
distribute the drugs that resulted in a death.
164
 
Although the Seventh Circuit agreed with the other circuits 
regarding foreseeability,
165
 it ultimately adopted a test established by 
                                                 
157
 Brief of Jamie J. Stewart, Defendant – Appellant and Required Short 
Appendix, United States v. Walker, 721 F.3d 828 (2013) (Nos. 11-1501, 10-2176, 
10-2355, 10-3788, 10-1024), 2011 WL 3679018, at *4. 
158
 Walker, 721 F.3d at 832. 
159
 Id. at 833. Four of the defendants had their sentences eventually reduced 
based on “substantial assistance provided to the government.” 
160
 Id. at 831. 
161
 Id. at 833. 
162
 Id. at 834. 
163




 See the discussion supra Section II.  The Circuit’s Application of § 841(b) 
to Individuals. 
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the Sixth Circuit for sentencing members of drug distribution 
conspiracies.
166
 The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Swiney
167
 
addressed a factually similar case to Walker.
168
 In that case, a grand 
jury returned a twenty-four-count indictment against twelve members 
of a drug distribution organization operating in Mountain 
Tennessee.
169
 The government argued, inter alia, that the defendants 
were involved in a conspiracy to distribute heroin and that a death 
resulted from the use of that heroin.
170
 
Seven of the defendants entered into plea agreements with the 
government.
171
 In exchange for guilty pleas for violating 21 U.S.C. § 
846, the drug conspiracy statute,
172
 the government agreed to dismiss 
the remaining charges against those defendants.
173
 None of the plea 
agreements, however, referred to any involvement in the sale of the 
heroin leading to a death.
174
 After considering the evidence, the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee held that 
only one of the defendants was responsible for a death and § 841(b)’s 
heightened sentencing.
175
 Therefore, the judge refused to impose § 
841(b)’s heightened sentences on the remaining defendants.
176
 The 
government appealed, asserting a right to a limited appeal based on 
“an incorrect application of the [Federal] Sentencing Guidelines.”
177
 
                                                 
166
 Walker, 721 F.3d at 834-35. 
167
 United States v. Swiney, 203 F.3d 397, 400 (6th Cir. 2000). 
168
 Walker, 721 F.3d at 831-32. 
169




 Id. at 400. 
172
 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West 2013); see supra note 116 for the text of the 
statute.  
173








 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(b)(2) (West 2003)). The text of § 3742(b)(2) 
reads: 
“(b) Appeal by the Government. 
--The Government may file a notice of appeal in the district court for review of 
an otherwise final sentence if the sentence [. . .] 
20
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The government argued that all of the defendants should be liable 
for the death because it is always reasonably foreseeable that someone 
will die after using heroin.
178
 Specifically, the government argued that 
the Supreme Court’s approach in Pinkerton v. United States controlled 
and that, under Pinkerton, defendants may be criminally liable for all 
reasonably foreseeable acts of co-conspirators regardless of actual 
knowledge, intent, or participation.
179
 
The Sixth Circuit disagreed, holding that the government’s 
Pinkerton argument only applied to conviction liability.
180
 Specifically, 
that court noted that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines “modified the 
Pinkerton theory of liability so as to harmonize it with the Guidelines’ 
goal of sentencing a defendant according to the ‘seriousness of the 
actual conduct of the defendant and his accomplices.’”
181
 As a result, 
“in a broad conspiracy, the relevant conduct considered in constructing 
the [sentencing range] may not be the same for every defendant in the 
conspiracy, although each may be equally liable for conviction under 
Pinkerton.”
182
 Therefore, although each defendant in a conspiracy may 
be criminally liable, district courts applying the minimum sentencing 
enhancements codified in § 841(b) must first find that each defendant 
was part of the actual distribution chain that lead to the death.
183
 
The Seventh Circuit adopted the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning and 
held that a district court must “make specific factual findings to 
determine whether each defendant’s relevant conduct encompasses the 
                                                                                                                   
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing 
guidelines[.]” 
178
 Swiney, 203 F.3d at 401-02. 
179
 Id. at 401-02 (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).); see 
also United States v. Myers, 102 F.3d 227 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Paul Marcus, 
Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back From An Ever Expanding Ever More 
Troubling Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 7 (1992). 
180
 Swiney, 203 F.3d at 404. 
181
 Id. (citing William W. Wilkins & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The 
Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C.L. REV. 495, 502 (1990)). 
182
 Id. at 403-04 (citing William W. Wilkins & John R. Steer, Relevant 
Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C.L. REV. 
495, 508-10 (1990)). 
183
 Id. at 406. 
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distribution chain that caused a victims death before applying the 
twenty-year penalty.”
184
 Using the “chain of distribution” test, the 
Seventh Circuit vacated the twenty-year minimum sentences for two 
of the defendants, Keith Walker and Eneal Gladney, but affirmed the 





D. The Chain of Distribution in Walker. 
 
The Seventh Circuit found that the relevant chain of distribution 
proceeded as follows: Stewart, operating as a “lieutenant,” organized 
high level distribution in the Milwaukee area.
186
 Stewart sold large 
quantities of heroin to Walker and Glandey, who ran operations in 
Milwaukee.
187
 Stewart sold heroin meant for Waukesha to Lund.
188
 
Lund, then, sold quantities of that heroin to Lawler.
189
  
The Seventh Circuit affirmed Stewart’s sentence because he, as a 
principal member in the heroin conspiracy, was the ultimate source of 
the drugs that killed all five users.
190
 The court quoted the trial judge, 
“Now, I appreciate you may not have been standing over [the 
deceased] when he took the final dose, but that is not what the law 
requires. The law simply tracks who provided the substance[.]”
191
 A 
“kingpin who finances and controls a drug distribution operation 
cannot escape liability for the ‘death resulting’ penalty simply because 
he never personally sold to customers.”
192
 
The Seventh Circuit then tracked the fatal drugs sold by Stewart 
in order to establish a chain of causation to the specific deaths. First, 
the court found that both Lund and Lawler, although occupying 
relatively low positions within the conspiracy, sold drugs obtained 
                                                 
184
 United States v. Walker, 721 F.3d 828, 831 (7th Cir. 2013).  
185
 Id. at 842. 
186
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from Stewart to two of the victims.
193
 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit 
noted that Lund and Lawler had “perhaps the closest connection to the 
deaths of customers who used drugs distributed by the conspiracy.”
194
 
Therefore, the court affirmed both Lund’s and Lawler’s minimum 
twenty-year sentences under § 841(b)(1)(A).
195
 Specifically, the 
Seventh Circuit held that there could be “little doubt” that the statute 
would apply to the two defendants.
196
 Although the court conceded 
that the deceased might have had a hypersensitivity to heroin, it 
ultimately held that the risk of death is inherent with illegal drug use 
and that distributors accept that risk at their own peril.
197
 
Finally, the Seventh Circuit held that the final two defendants, 
Walker and Gladney, were not a part of the chain of distribution.
198
 
Citing the Sixth Circuit,
199
 the court noted that there is a difference 
between criminal liability for acts committed by members of a 
criminal conspiracy and the specific sentencing consequences 
applicable to each member of that conspiracy.
200
 Although Walker and 
Gladney could be subject to criminal prosecution, the government 
offered no evidence that they actually contributed to the sales that 
killed the five decedents.
201
 
Instead, the Seventh Circuit noted that four of the five decedents 
lived and died in Waukesha, Wisconsin.
202
 Walker and Gladney, 
however, only operated drug distribution within Milwaukee.
203
 And 
the only decedent from Milwaukee died because he purchased drugs 
directly from a third-party that was not involved in this litigation.
204
 
                                                 
193










 Id. at 838. 
199
 United States v. Swiney, 203 F.3d 397, 406 (6th Cir. 2000). 
200








 Id. (noting that the third-party ultimately bought his heroin from Johnson, 
the head of the conspiracy). 
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Because Walker and Gladney were not part of any distribution efforts 
outside of Milwaukee, they were outside of the chain of distribution.
205
 
The Seventh Circuit, however, did note that merely acting outside 
of the chain of distribution might not always defeat § 841(b)’s 
minimum sentencing requirement.
206
 The court offered the following 
analogy: 
 
A gives drugs to B, B sells them to C, and C dies. D, a 
member of the overall drug conspiracy, may be subject to the 
twenty-year sentencing penalty even though she did not 
directly sell the fatal dose to C, but “the court must first 
determine the scope of the criminal activity the particular 
defendant agreed to jointly undertake” under U.S.S.G. § 
1B1.3(a)(1)(B)
207
 before the penalty is applied. Otherwise, 
we have no way to know whether a defendant is being 
sentenced on the basis of drugs that were distributed in 
furtherance of the conspiracy and that distribution was 
reasonably foreseeable, or whether a defendant is being 






 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (West 2013). This statute establishes factors for 
determining the range of sentences available for convicted individuals. Specifically, 
this statute establishes:  
“Chapters Two (Offense Conduct) and Three (Adjustments). Unless otherwise 
specified, (i)  
the base offense level where the guideline specifies more than one base offense 
level, (ii) specific offense characteristics and (iii) cross references in Chapter 
Two, and (iv) adjustments in Chapter Three, shall be determined on the basis of 
the following: 
(1)(B): in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, 
scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with 
others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts 
and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal 
activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in 
preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or 
responsibility for that offense[.]” 
24
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sentenced strictly on the basis of his general participation in a 




Because the government offered no evidence that Walker and 
Gladney sold drugs, even if not to the decedents, in furtherance of a 
specific conspiracy in Waukesha, they were not subject to the 
minimum sentencing requirement. 
 
III. WALKER UNIFIES THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF § 
841(B) SENTENCING FOR DRUG QUANTITIES AND DRUG-
RELATED DEATHS. 
 
With Walker, the Seventh Circuit took an important step toward a 
unified application of § 841(b) sentences. Indeed, the Walker court 
clearly stated that the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning already applied in a 
“parallel context” in Seventh Circuit jurisprudence: § 841(b)’s 
minimum sentencing provisions for quantities of drugs trafficked by 
criminal conspiracies.
209




First, in U.S. v. Edwards, a Grand Jury returned a 132-count 
indictment against members of “the ‘IBM’ of heroin distribution 
systems on the south side of Chicago” for participating in a three-year 
heroin distribution conspiracy.
211
 After the jury found all members of 
the conspiracy guilty, a trial judge issued sentences ranging from 
seven- to thirty-years.
212
  The defendants appealed.
213
 
Although the Seventh Circuit affirmed all of the convictions, it 
remanded for new sentences for several of the defendants.
214
 The 
Seventh Circuit held that heightened sentences for varied amounts of 
drug quantities only applied to sales that were reasonably foreseeable 
                                                 
208
 Walker, 721 F.3d at 838. 
209




U.S. v. Edwards, 945 F.3d 1387, 1395 (7th Cir. 1991). 
212




 Id. at 1404. 
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 Therefore, when sentencing defendants for drug 
quantities sold by a conspiracy, a defendant’s liability for sentencing 
purposes must be limited to the drug transactions each defendant was 
“aware of or that he should have reasonably foreseen.”
216
 The trial 
court, therefore, erred when it failed to consider the scope of the 
agreement each defendant had with his co-conspirators.
217
 Instead, the 
trial court, like the Walker court, must consider each defendant’s 
involvement within the actual conspiracy before sentencing.
218
 
The Walker court also cited a 2011 decision, U.S. v. Alvarado-
Tizoc.
219
 In Alvardo-Tizoc, several defendants were wholesalers of 
heroin and fentanyl
220
 who sold fentanyl to various “retail dealers.”
221
 
The retailers then diluted the fentanyl and sold it to consumers.
222
 
Once diluted, the weight of the fentanyl mixture was approximately 11 
to 16 times the weight of the pure fentanyl sold by the defendants.
223
 
Despite the dilution, federal sentencing provisions
224
 allowed courts to 
treat the combined weight of the diluted fentanyl as if it was the pure 
                                                 
215
 Id. at 1395. 
216
 Id. (citing U.S. v. Guerrero, 894 F.3d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
217
 Id. at 1396. 
218
 Id. at 1395. 
219
 United States v. Walker, 721 F.3d, 828, 835 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. 
Alvarado-Tizoc, 656 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2011). 
220
 Alvarado-Tizoc, 656 F.3d at 741-72 (“Fentanyl is a very potent synthetic 
narcotic, used lawfully as a painkiller and unlawfully as a substitute for heroin. [. . .] 
Because of its potency it must be greatly diluted before being consumed; otherwise it 
will kill.” (citations omitted)). 
221
 Id. at 742. 
222




 U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)n.A. (West ). U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) lists a drug quantity 
table that enumerates various base offense levels for different quantities of controlled 
substances. Note A reads:  
“Unless otherwise specified, the weight of a controlled substance set forth in 
the table refers to the entire weight of any mixture or substance containing a 
detectable amount of the controlled substance. If a mixture or substance 
contains more than one controlled substance, the weight of the entire mixture or 
substance is assigned to the controlled substance that results in the greater 
offense level.” 
26
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 Therefore, although the retailers had diluted the fentanyl, 
the sentencing rules treated them as if they were selling more fentanyl 
than their actual suppliers.
226
 
The trial judge, however, applied the amount of fentanyl sold by 
the retailers to the wholesalers and increased their sentences.
227
 The 
district court argued that the wholesaling was a “jointly undertaken 
criminal activity” with the retailers, and therefore, the defendants were 
liable for any “reasonably foreseeable acts,” including all subsequent 
sales of diluted fentanyl.
228
 The wholesalers appealed.
229
 
The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s decision and 
remanded for new sentencing.
230
 First, the Seventh Circuit noted that, 
although the case law interpreting the sentencing guidelines treats 
“jointly undertaken criminal activity” the same as “criminal 
conspiracies,” courts have never held that a seller is a part of a 
conspiracy with a “mere buyer.”
231
 Without more evidence, the mere 
commercial transaction between the wholesalers and retailers was not 




Notwithstanding the district court’s mistake, the wholesalers 
could still be subject to heightened sentences.
233
 Because some drugs, 
including fentanyl, are frequently diluted before reaching consumers, 
defendants could be subject to heightened sentences based on their 
place in the “chain of distribution.”
234
 One factor that courts may 
consider when addressing the “chain of distribution” is whether an 
individual selling a highly potent drug occupies a higher level on the 
“chain of distribution.”
235
 Although the Seventh Circuit noted that a 
                                                 
225






 Id. at 743. 
229
 Id. at 740. 
230
 Id. at 747. 
231
 Id. at 743-44. 
232
 Id. at 743. 
233
 Id. at 744. 
234
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drug’s potency, without more evidence, is not dispositive of a 
defendant’s position on the “chain of distribution,” a judge may still 
use the relative number of doses produced by the seller’s quantities of 
drugs as a sentencing factor.
236
 Therefore, that court remanded for new 
sentences based on the drugs actually sold by the defendants.
237
 
Both of these cases show a natural progression towards the court’s 
decision in Walker. First, Edwards established that a defendant’s 
liability for sentencing purposes should be based upon the defendant’s 
actual involvement in a criminal conspiracy.
238
 Alvarado-Tizoc then 
expanded that by looking at both the scope of a defendant’s 
involvement in a conspiracy and a defendant’s place on the “chain of 
distribution.”
239
 Finally, Walker and its predecessors firmly established 
a difference between a defendant’s criminal liability and the extent to 







In U.S. v. Walker, the Seventh Circuit held that courts, before 
applying § 841(b)’s minimum sentences for drug-related deaths to 
members of criminal conspiracies, must first make factual findings 
regarding the chain of distribution for each fatal dose of drug.
241
 This 
test, adopted from the Sixth Circuit, marks a departure from traditional 
application of § 841(b) towards individuals by removing any 
indication of “strict liability” and, instead, asking courts to take 
additional fact-specific steps.
242
 Although the Sixth and Seventh 
Circuit represent a minority view for drug-related deaths, the Seventh 
Circuit’s test does not represent a departure from its traditional 




 Id. at 746. 
238
 United States v. Edwards, 945 F.3d 1387, 1395 (7th Cir. 1991). 
239
 Alvarado-Tizoc, 656 F.3d at 743, 745. 
240
 United States v. Walker, 721 F.3d 828, 835-36 (7th Cir 2013). 
241
 Id. at 836. 
242
 Id. at 835-36. 
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treatment of members of drug-distribution conspiracies.
243
 To the 
contrary, the Seventh Circuit’s fact-intensive requirement for 
sentencing for drug-related deaths fits directly in line with its previous 
holdings for mandatory minimum sentences for drug quantities 
trafficked by a conspiracy.
244
 By adopting similar standards for two 
major areas of § 841(b) sentences, the Seventh Circuit’s tests increase 
predictability for defendants and give trial judges more discretion to 
apply sentences based on the unique facts in each case. 
 
                                                 
243
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